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In Canada, the federal government appoints judges to the superior trial
courts and appellate courts in the provinces. While historically this power
has not received the same media attention as the federal appointment
power in the United States, the Canadian process has come under sus-
tained scrutiny in recent decades. Indeed, following significant criticism
in the early 1980s that the appointment process was unduly tainted by
partisan considerations, the Conservative government created a new
appointment process. This new process included the introduction of
“screening committees” made up of various stakeholders ~including legal
representatives! who were responsible for vetting candidates.
However, scrutiny of the appointment process has continued and some
suggest the changes have not had the desired effect. Various reports by
academics, law societies and the media have suggested that party affili-
ation remains an important consideration in the new appointment pro-
cess ~see, for example, Hausegger et al., 2010; Meek, 1998; Schmitz,
2005!. These reports also suggest that a new factor has become impor-
tant in the appointment process: gender. This latest finding has been a
matter of controversy, pleasing some observers who argue that the fed-
eral bench should be more representative and angering others who argue
that an appointment should be based strictly on “merit.” An additional
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controversy has sprung up surrounding the appointment process of Ste-
phen Harper’s Conservative government, which has promised to appoint
more “law-and-order” judges. Some commentators suggest that the gov-
ernment is attempting to fulfill this promise in part by appointing more
judges who were former Crown attorneys ~Schmitz, 2007!. However, while
many are suggesting that partisan affiliation, gender and professional
background may be influencing the appointment process, and some have
called into question the fairness of such influences, little attention has
been directed at determining whether it matters. Do different influences
on the appointment process result in different decisions by the chosen
judges?
In 2007, James Stribopoulos and Moin Yahya argued that a judge’s
gender and party of appointment can lead to different outcomes in cer-
tain kinds of cases decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal between 1990
and 2003. This suggests that these influences on judicial selection might
matter. However, Stribopoulos andYahya base their model on a large inter-
action term between all of their four variables of interest ~case category,
the decision below, party that appointed the judge and the judge’s gen-
der!, which makes the separate influences difficult to determine. We also
argue that “party of appointment” is not the most meaningful measure.
Although many scholars, particularly those in the United States, use party
of appointment as a surrogate for “policy preferences,” this overlooks
some important realities of the federal judicial appointment process in
Canada. Governments tend to favour their own partisans in the selection
process, but they also appoint a number of individuals who have no polit-
ical background and occasionally appoint individuals who are connected
to an opposition party. This suggests that if policy preferences influence
the votes of these judges, party of appointment may not accurately mea-
sure it.
There are also varying degrees of party affiliation; presumably, a
campaign manager might have stronger attachments to party policies than
a person who makes the occasional donation to a party. We argue that
party affiliation would be a more accurate measure of policy preferences
than party of appointment and would also better map the Canadian judi-
cial process by looking more closely at possible connections between
selection processes and decision making.
After reviewing the relevant existing literatures on selection and deci-
sion making, we build on the database generously provided to us by Stri-
bopoulos andYahya and examine the influence of party affiliation, gender
and professional background on decision making in the Ontario Court of
Appeal between 1990 and 2003. In doing so, we hope to begin to address
a number of issues in the existing literature, including the reliance on
“party of appointment” as a proxy for policy preferences; the lack of
attention paid to courts below the Supreme Court; the lack of attention
666 LORI HAUSEGGER ET AL.
paid to whether professional background might influence judicial deci-
sion making; and, more generally, the tendency of the literature not to
explicitly examine the possible connections between judicial selection and
decision making.
1. Judicial Process, Selection and Decision Making
The question of judicial decision making in Canada has been assessed
primarily by research on the Canadian Supreme Court ~Flemming, 2004;
Ostberg and Wetstein, 2007; Songer, 2008!. Recently, some of this work
has started to address the influence of gender on that court’s decision
making. In 2011, Johnson and her colleagues examined Supreme Court
votes between 1982 and 2007 and concluded that female Supreme Court
justices vote differently from their male counterparts in a variety of areas
~see also Johnson and Songer, 2009!. Female justices voted more liber-
ally in equality, civil rights and private economic cases but more conser-
vatively in criminal cases, a finding that was not dependent on the female
justices reaching a critical mass on the court.
The focus on the Supreme Court is understandable given that court’s
position at the apex of the Canadian judicial hierarchy. However, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court averages less than 100 decisions per year, which
means that the provincial courts of appeal are the final courts of appeal
for many cases in Canada. This in turn means that these courts play an
important role in shaping the law. This is especially true of the Ontario
Court of Appeal, which most years decides well over ten times as many
cases as the Supreme Court ~in 2004–2005, for instance, the OCA decided
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over 1,700 cases! and is often considered the most respected provincial
appellate court. Indeed, this court has been referred to as the “junior
Supreme Court” because of its doctrinal leadership ~see Greene et al.,
1998: 146!. Unfortunately, these courts have not been subject to schol-
arly interest in their decision-making processes commensurate with their
importance in the Canadian judicial process.
1.1 Judicial process and selection
The provincial appellate courts act as penultimate appellate courts below
the Supreme Court, typically using three-judge panels. Each provincial
appeal court has a wide jurisdiction and hears cases involving both pro-
vincial laws ~encompassing everything from the environment to educa-
tion to highways! and federal laws ~including the Criminal Code of
Canada!. However, within their jurisdictions, these courts possess lim-
ited discretion over the cases they hear.
The judges making these decisions are appointed by the federal gov-
ernment. Individuals who apply for an appeal court position without any
prior judicial experience, have their applications vetted by a screening
committee composed of legal members, lay members and, more recently,
a police officer. Candidates are evaluated on their professional qualifica-
tions ~including awareness of racial and gender issues! and personal char-
acteristics and then “recommended” or “not recommended” to the Minister
of Justice who retains full discretion to choose among candidates. The
majority of candidates are promoted from a lower court and do not go
through the committee process at this stage. However, the minister typi-
cally undertakes consultations with the legal community before promot-
ing someone ~for a more detailed description of the appointment process,
see Hausegger et al., 2010!.
Our earlier research on federal judicial appointments following the
introduction of the screening committees shows that for the 1989 to 2003
time period 27 per cent of provincial appeal court appointees had “major”
participation with the governing party that appointed them ~such as
campaign organizing or close social ties to a cabinet minister!, and 15
per cent had more “minor” activities and associations ~political dona-
tions, minor constituency work! with the governing party. The trends
were relatively consistent between Conservative and Liberal govern-
ments ~see Hausegger et al., 2010, for a detailed description of all these
data!.
In addition to political affiliation playing a role in judicial selection
to appellate courts, group identity, particularly gender, has become more
of a consideration in the judicial appointments. The federal government
in Canada made adding women to the bench more of a priority after the
introduction of the screening committees. Approximately one-third of
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appointees to the provincial appellate courts from 1989 to 2003 were
women ~Riddell et al., 2008!.
Overall, therefore, judicial appointment processes have resulted in
Canadian provincial appellate courts that feature a number of individu-
als who were affiliated with the party in control of the executive branch
prior to appointment. These processes have also placed an increasing num-
ber of women on these courts. The question raised is whether these pat-
terns matter to case outcomes.
1.2 Judicial decision making
a! Party of appointing executive and policy preferences
Scholarship on decision making in Canadian courts of appeal is limited
but there is a bourgeoning scholarship on decision making in US courts
of appeal that can provide theoretical and empirical guidance. This work
often uses quantitative models to address the question of whether politi-
cal orientations or personal characteristics ~such as gender, race or pro-
fessional background! matter to case outcomes. Such models have been
useful for demonstrating that the policy preferences of US federal courts
of appeals judges matter at least somewhat to case outcomes in relatively
predictable ways. Democratic judges are more likely to support the lib-
eral position than Republican judges ~Cross, 2007; Songer et al., 2000;
Sunstein et al., 2004!. Sunstein and his colleagues ~2004!, for example,
used the ideology of the appointing president as a measure of the ideol-
ogy of appellate justices and found that ideology was a statistically sig-
nificant explanatory factor in such politically contested case categories
as gay and lesbian rights, sex discrimination, labour and capital punish-
ment. Judges appointed by a Democratic president voted for a more “lib-
eral” outcome than their Republican-appointed counterparts. In a number
of case categories, these individual ideological tendencies were either
amplified or weakened depending on the ideology of the other panel mem-
bers ~319!. The ideological dampening effect might be explained by col-
legiality. Colleagues’ votes can “carry some information about what is
right” ~338!.
b! Gender
In a 2010 study, Boyd and her colleagues found that female judges were
significantly more likely to vote for the claimant in sex discrimination
suits in the federal court of appeals between 1995 and 2002, even after
including ideology as a control. They also found that men were 12 to 16
per cent more likely to vote in favour of the claimant if a woman was on
the panel. Peresie ~2005! found similar gender effects at the individual
and panel level in a study of 556 sex discrimination and sexual harass-
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ment suits in federal courts between 1999 and 2001. Likewise, Farhang
and Wawro’s analysis ~2004! of employment discrimination cases revealed
that the presence of one female judge on the panel increased the proba-
bility of a male voting for the claimant by 19 per cent, though the addi-
tion of a subsequent female on the panel did not further increase the
propensity of the male to vote for the claimant ~320!. They attribute the
influence of a female presence to some combination of male judges being
persuaded of a female viewpoint through deliberation and strategic cal-
culations to achieve consensus ~325!.
However, with the exception of discrimination cases, the evidence
is mixed about whether gender matters to judging on US federal courts
of appeal ~for an extensive review of previous work, see Boyd et al., 2010!.
Women judges in various criminal cases, for example, have been found
to be more liberal ~Cross, 2007!, more conservative ~Massie et al., 2002!,
or no different ~Songer et al., 1994! from their male colleagues.
c! Professional background
In determining whether a judge’s occupational background matters to deci-
sion making, the focus has tended to be on whether prior prosecutorial
or defence counsel experience leads individuals to be more conservative
or liberal, respectively. Controlling for other factors, Cross ~2007! found
that judges with previous experience in private practice were slightly more
likely to make liberal decisions and former assistant district attorneys
slightly more likely to make conservative decisions but being a former
district attorney, US attorney, assistant US attorney or special prosecutor
made no difference ~84–85; see also work by Frank et al., 1987; John-
son, 2006; Sisk et al., 1998!.
d! Canadian studies
In one of the rare studies of Canadian provincial courts of appeal, Greene
and his colleagues ~1998! interviewed close to 100 appellate judges
between 1991 and 1995. Former Supreme Court Justice Bertha Wilson’s
assertion that female judges will make a difference to judicial decision
making is noted ~25!, but no interview questions appear to have been
asked about it. The authors do, however, note that ethnicity was not men-
tioned by a single judge as being related to case outcomes ~33!. More-
over, only a third of respondents said that their colleagues could be divided
into ideological groups ~77!. The unusual access to judges given to Greene
and his colleagues provides interesting information about the judges’ own
beliefs about their decision making but it does not test whether the judges’
actual decision making was consistent with their description in interviews.
Stribopoulos andYahya ~2007! begin to fill this important gap.1 Using
a database of over 4000 issues decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal
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between 1990 and 2003, they investigate whether gender or ideology ~as
measured by party of appointment!, mattered to case outcomes. Cases
are broken into large categories ~such as criminal, family, corporate, pri-
vate and human rights! and subcategories ~for example, criminal includes
subcategories such as offences against property and narcotics!. The authors
combined their variables of interest in one large interaction term and ran
logits on the categories ~full and subtype! to test for gender and ideolog-
ical influence on individual voting and panel outcomes.
As one of the first studies in the area, the Stribopoulos and Yahya
study appears to be mostly exploratory. The results are presented in such
a way that makes summarizing difficult, but among the results high-
lighted by the authors are that individual Conservative appointees tended
to favour the Crown over the accused slightly more than Liberals did in
criminal cases ~although this depended somewhat on the case category
and which party appealed!. As for gender on an individual-level basis,
female judges were less likely to overturn an acquittal when the Crown
appealed a case where the accused had successfully made a Charter of
Rights challenge.
The Stribopoulos and Yahya project marks an important contribu-
tion to the study of appellate decision making in Canada providing detailed
descriptive statistics on the cases and judges of the Ontario Court of
Appeal and creating an extensive database which they use to test influ-
ences on decision making. Here we hope to build upon that foundation
both methodologically and theoretically. Perhaps most importantly, we
argue that using “party of appointment” as a proxy for ideology in Can-
ada is less likely to produce valid results than in the US. The rate at
which party affiliates are appointed to provincial courts of appeal is lower
than the appointments of party affiliates to the US federal courts of appeal
~Tarr, 2014: 67!. Moreover, Canadian governments sometimes appoint
opposition affiliates or individuals with no political background to pro-
vincial courts of appeal; indeed our previous work suggests only 42% of
those appointed to the courts of appeal have either major or minor con-
nections to the party appointing them ~Hausegger et al., 2010!. Not only
might using “party of appointment” lead to a judge being mislabeled in
the data set, but even when it does capture a judge’s actual political affil-
iation correctly, its value might be limited. It does not tell us how active
the individual was with a party, which may be an indicator of commit-
ment to the party and its policies.
2. Hypotheses and Measurement
Our study attempts to understand the effect of a variety of judicial char-
acteristics on our dependent variable: an individual judge’s vote. We exam-
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ine the influences on this dependent variable in four case categories:
criminal non-charter, criminal charter, family and human rights. The inde-
pendent variables take into account the party affiliation, gender and pro-
fessional background of the judges hearing a case, and control for the
other factors thought to influence their decision making.
a! Party affiliation
Canadian political scientists have long debated whether federal political
parties are organizations that consist of shifting coalitions of interests
tied together through brokerage of regional, linguistic and cultural differ-
ences, or are organizations of ideologically like-minded people ~Johnston,
1988!. It appears that the answer lies somewhere in between. Ideology
appears to play a role in structuring political attitudes in both the Liberal
party and the former Progressive Conservative ~PC! party, but both of
those parties were less ideologically inclined than the NDP on the left
and the former Reform0Canadian Alliance party on the right. In a 2000
survey of Canadian political party members, Young and Cross found that
those who joined the Liberals or PCs did so more for social reasons,
while those who joined the NDP and Canadian Alliance did so more for
ideological reasons ~2002!. Nevertheless, PC respondents still placed
themselves and their party to the right of the more centrist scores for
Liberal respondents.
These results are promising for coding our PC affiliated judges as
being more conservative in general than Liberal affiliates. However, since
the judges we coded as “Conservative” partisans were all on the bench
prior to the schism on the right, we need to examine potential ideolog-
ical differences between PC and Liberal partisans before the creation of
the Reform party in 1987 ~which became the Canadian Alliance in 2000!.
A 1977 survey of six hundred elites in business, politics, law, bureau-
cracy, academia, labour and the media revealed that there were consid-
erable differences between PC and Liberal supporters on social welfare0
redistribution and state economic intervention scales ~Ornstein and
Stevenson, 1984!.
A survey administered to delegates at the 1983 PC national conven-
tion, and the 1984 Liberal national convention, showed divisions between
the party delegates on issue scales related to such matters as support for
social security ~Liberal mean  2.63, PC mean  1.67!, “hawkish” atti-
tudes ~Liberal mean  2.65, PC mean  4.17! and anti-corporate power
sentiments ~Liberal mean  1.98, PC mean  1.58! ~Blake, 1988: 40!.
From this, Donald Blake concludes that despite considerable variation
within the parties on certain issues—and some of the relatively small
differences between the parties on some issues—the “ideological model
of interparty differences seems to have considerable support” ~1988: 48!.
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Johnston ~1988! used a factor analysis of that same dataset collected at
the conventions to evaluate whether delegates’ political views in each
party hung together in some coherent fashion. He argues that, although
there was still sizeable unexplained variance, “ideological thinking per-
vaded each party’s delegation” ~1988: 60!.
A 1987 survey on rights and democratic values suggests that Liber-
als might be somewhat more supportive of rights claims ~Sniderman et al.,
2000!. The results showed that Liberal and PC party elites were both less
supportive of rights than the NDP, but on a number of issues the PC
elites are more “conservative” ~less supportive of rights! than the Liber-
als. For instance, PC elites are more likely than Liberal elites to support
banning sexually explicit acts in films, searching someone walking near
a drug house and allowing customs officers to conduct a body search
without a warrant ~Sniderman et al., 2000: 576–78, 584!.
Taken as a whole, we believe that the PC-affiliated judges will be
more conservative on social and economic issues than Liberal affiliates.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the stronger a judge’s ties are to the Lib-
eral party the more likely that judge is to vote for the accused in crimi-
nal cases, for women in family law cases and for the rights claimant in
human rights cases. However, we expect these effects to be reasonably
small, given that the differences between the parties on a number of issues,
are not large.
We test our hypothesis using a measure of a judge’s partisan ties. In
previous work ~Hausegger et al., 2010!, we have used surveys and inter-
views of legal elites2 to determine the strength and direction of political
ties for judges appointed by the federal government from 1989 to 2003.
Judges are classified as having had minor political ties for activities such
as donating to a political party or performing constituency work. Judges
are classified as having had major political ties if they engaged in activ-
ities such as fundraising, organizing a campaign or running for office.
They are also considered to have had major ties if they had a close social
or professional relationship with someone who had a major direct involve-
ment in the party such as a cabinet minister or an executive member ~see
Hausegger et al., 2010, for a detailed description of the data and the clas-
sifications!. For this paper, we took those designations and created a mea-
sure of the direction and strength of a judge’s tie. The variable ranges
from 2 ~major Conservative party ties! to 2 ~major Liberal party ties!;
judges found to have no political ties were coded as 0.
However, the US literature also suggests that institutional factors,
such as collegial decision making, can serve to restrain the influence of
ideological tendencies. Following Sunstein and his colleagues ~2004!, and
Farhang and Wawro ~2004!, we test for these factors in our models of
the influences on individual judge’s votes. It may be that the effects of a
judge’s political ties are reduced by the presence of judges with oppos-
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ing ties on the panel. With three or five judges hearing a case, and the
need for a majority vote, negotiations and compromises are often neces-
sary. This level of appeals court also has a strong norm of unanimity,
which increases the chances that judges may compromise with others
and not vote their sincere political preference. To test for this phenom-
enon we include a variable measuring if a judge with Conservative party
ties is sitting on a panel with someone with Liberal party ties, and a
variable measuring whether a judge with Liberal party ties is sitting on a
panel with someone with Conservative party ties.
b! Gender
Predicting the influence of gender on decision making is difficult. As sug-
gested above, the empirical results are often contradictory even in the same
area of law. Moreover, the theoretical explanations or predictions are often
inadequate or missing. Implicitly or explicitly, however, expectations about
women voting differently from men most often rely directly or indirectly
on Carol Gilligan’s suggestion ~1982! that women’s socialization leads
them to develop an “ethic of care” that is different from a masculine per-
spective ~Boyd et al., 2010; Gidengil et al., 2005; Malleson, 2003!. More
specifically, women are more likely to value relationships, consensus,
inclusion and community in caring for others compared to the more indi-
vidualistic, confrontational and competitive masculine outlook. Gilli-
gan’s work has been the subject of empirical and theoretical criticism, but
as Beiner notes, the theory continues to be discussed and tested because
“something about it rings true, or at least true based on some stereotyped
notion of the way in which women behave” ~2002: 602!.
Recognizing that the underlying assumptions about why women may
vote differently than men are contested and that translating these assump-
tions into actual predictions is difficult, for the purposes of this analysis
we nevertheless make the following predictions. In criminal non-charter
and criminal charter cases, female judges will be more likely to vote for
the accused, who is often socially disadvantaged and is being threatened
with criminal sanctions that are potentially isolating and stigmatizing.3
Since many rights cases ~legislative and constitutional! advance argu-
ments about protecting or providing benefits for the disadvantaged, we
predict that female judges will be more likely to vote for rights claimants
than male judges. In family law, female judges might be more able to
identify with the perspective of the woman, and therefore, we predict
that female judges will be more likely to support the female litigant’s posi-
tion, other things being equal. For each of the above categories gender is
measured using a dummy variable ~1 for a female judge, 0 otherwise!.
Thus far we have framed gender predictions on an individual-level
basis. However, recent research suggests that a judge’s decision may be
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influenced by the gender of colleagues on the panel ~Farhang and Wawro,
2004; Peresie, 2005!. Consistent with the arguments made under parti-
san affiliation, we expect the norms of collegiality and unanimity to have
an effect. Following Farhang and Wawro, we attempt to capture this pos-
sibility for gender in our models using independent variables measuring
the presence of female colleagues on a panel. One variable measures
whether a female judge has a female colleague on the panel, another vari-
able measures a female colleague joining a male judge and a third vari-
able measures whether more than one female colleague joins a male judge
on a panel. We expect the addition of a female colleague will make a
vote for the accused (in criminal cases), or the rights claimant (in human
rights cases) or the female litigant (in family cases), more likely. We are
also interested in whether adding multiple females to the panel increases
this effect.
c! Professional background
Intuitively, one might suspect that experience as a prosecutor or govern-
ment lawyer in rights cases would make a judge more likely to support
the government in criminal and human rights cases respectively. Alterna-
tively, a former defence lawyer might be more prone to be supportive of
the accused in criminal cases. There is some limited empirical support
for these propositions, so we include them in the model. Out of interest
we also test whether prior experience as a government lawyer influences
family law decisions. We have no strong expectation here, but govern-
ment lawyer is a frequent prior occupation for judges and we want to
explore its effect.
We determined a judge’s former occupation using resources such as
publicly available biographies. Some judges, of course, worked in multi-
ple fields before coming to the bench. These judges were coded accord-
ing to which was the dominant career in their past ~for example, the career
where they worked the longest!.
d! Other possible influences
Research on intermediate courts of appeal highlights the importance of
institutional context to judicial decision making. Scholars in the US have
found that deference to lower courts and appellant-type are particularly
consequential to the decisions made by the US courts of appeal. In Can-
ada, research by Greene and his colleagues ~1998; also see McCormick,
1993! suggests that the combined effect of these factors needs to be con-
sidered. For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal has a tendency to favour
the Crown on criminal appeals. Greene and his colleagues speculate that
this could be related to strict screening practices by the Crown on which
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cases to appeal. Therefore, we include in our model a variable measuring
whether the Crown was the appellant in a criminal case. We expect the
presence of the Crown as an appellant to make a vote for the accused
less likely.
The Ontario Court of Appeal has a much higher rate of affirming in
non-criminal cases. Therefore, we included in our model variables mea-
suring the identity of the appellant in other case categories as well. We
expect having a female litigant as the appellant in family law cases will
make a decision in favour of the female litigant less likely, since the court
is less likely to reverse overall. We have similar expectations for when
the rights claimant is the appellant in human rights cases. The inclusion
of these variables helps to control for the influence of the lower court’s
decision.
3. The Models
In this paper, multivariate models are used to determine the factors influ-
encing the judicial decision making of the Ontario Court of Appeal from
1990 to 2003. The cases included are part of the database created by
Stribopoulos andYahya ~2007!, in which case participants and judge votes
were coded for all reported cases of the court.4
While Stribopoulos and Yahya analyze the over 4900 case issues
together through a large interaction term of all their variables ~case cat-
egory times the decision below times party appointing judge times gen-
der of the judge!, we prefer to run separate models for each case category.
In this way we hope to create a more “natural experiment” ~Farhang and
Wawro, 2004! of a narrower issue area without the distraction of the wide
variety of factual and legal issues that occur across case categories. This
may be even more important for the Canadian courts of appeal given the
wide range of issues they hear. We argue that large differences may exist,
for example, between criminal non-charter cases and family law cases.
The possibility of these differences suggests separate models may make
it easier to distinguish the variety of influences on decision making and
thus make systematic analysis of these influences more meaningful.
We ran models for four different case categories: ~1! criminal non-
charter ~including, for example, narcotics and property crimes!, ~2! crim-
inal charter, ~3! family ~primarily child and spousal support, and child
custody!, ~4! human rights ~non-criminal charter cases and human rights
cases!. The dependent variables are dichotomous in all the models: a vote
in favour of the accused ~criminal cases!, the woman ~family!, the rights
claimant ~human rights!, or not. Therefore, logit models were estimated.
The independent variables of interest include the judge’s gender, the
strength and direction of his or her party affiliation, the judge’s past pro-
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fessional experience5 and the appellant in the case.6 This latter measure
functioned as a control for the Crown’s high success rate in criminal cases,
and as a control for the court’s slight propensity to affirm cases in the
other issue areas.7
However, Courts ofAppeal hear cases in panels of three or five judges,
and as argued above, the need to reach a majority vote means judges may
influence one another through negotiation and compromise. To account
for this institutional characteristic we also included variables in the mod-
els measuring the presence of female colleagues on a panel and the pres-
ence of colleagues of opposing party affiliation. Following Farhang and
Wawro ~2004!, for gender we included a variable measuring if a female
judge has a female colleague on the panel, another measuring a female
colleague joining a male judge and a third variable measuring whether
more than one female colleague joined a male judge on a panel. For party
affiliation we included a variable measuring whether a Liberal-affiliated
judge is on a panel with a colleague with ties to the Progressive Conser-
vative party and a variable measuring whether a PC-affiliated judge was
joined by a colleague with Liberal ties.
As discussed above, our measure of “party affiliation” comes out
of our previous research on judicial selection ~Hausegger et al., 2010!,
and we argue that it more accurately captures the judge’s connection to
a party and its policies ~and thus better approximates a judge’s policy
preferences! than a measure of “party of appointing prime minister.”
Our interest in this measure led us to also estimate each case category
model of individual judge vote with party of appointing prime minister
as a variable to compare results. In this estimate we attempted to cap-
ture the influence of colleagues through variables measuring if a Pro-
gressive Conservative-appointed judge was on a panel with Liberal
appointees and whether a Liberal-appointed judge was on a panel with
PC appointees.
4. Results
Tables 2 to 5 show the results of the logit analyses of the variables hypoth-
esized to influence the votes of judges on the Ontario Court of Appeal in
each of our four case categories. Table 1 summarizes the results for our
variables of interest. For each case category, a “yes” next to a variable
indicates that it performed in the expected direction and is significant at
the 0.05 level or better ~unless otherwise noted on the table!.
a! Party affiliation
Tables 2 and 3 suggest that party affiliation had some influence on a
judge’s vote in criminal non-charter and criminal charter case issues. A
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vote for the accused was more likely the stronger the judge’s Liberal party
ties ~p,.001!. Indeed, a judge with major Liberal party ties was 21 per
cent more likely to vote for the accused in a criminal charter case than a
judge with major Progressive Conservative party ties ~see Table 6 for the
probability change of significant variables!. However, both these models
suggest that judges with Liberal ties were less likely to vote for the
accused when judges with Progressive Conservative ties sat on a panel
with them ~p  .001 and p  .06!. Thus there is evidence in these case
categories that a judge’s colleagues can influence their vote. This is con-
sistent with the ideological dampening effect of panels discussed earlier.
A judge’s own party ties does not appear to have influenced his or
her vote in family or human rights case issues, but sitting on a panel
with those that had such ties does appear to have had an effect. A vote
for the woman in a family law case issue, such as child custody or spou-
sal support was 19 per cent less likely from a judge with Liberal ties if
he or she sat on a panel with a judge with PC ties ~p,.01!.
In human rights issues, a vote for the rights claimant was 23 per
cent more likely from a judge with PC party ties when he or she was
TABLE 1
Summary of Variable Results from Logit Analysis, Individual Judge





Gender Yes No Yes Yes
Female judge with another
female
No No No No
Male judge with 1 female
judge
Yes No No Yes
~at .06!
Male judge with multiple
females
No No No No
Party ties Yes Yes No No
Judge with Conservative ties
on panel with at least one
judge with Liberal ties
No No No Yes
Judge with Liberal
ties on panel with





Past Crown or government
attorney
No No Yes Yes
Past defense No Yes N0A N0A
Crown or woman or rts
claimant ~depending on
case type! as appellant
Yes No Yes Yes
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sitting on a panel with someone with Liberal party ties ~p,.05!. This
result is interesting as it only appears in the human rights area; judges
with PC party ties do not behave significantly differently in any other
issue area when on a panel with a judge with Liberal ties. By contrast,
judges with Liberal party ties appear to be influenced by their PC col-
leagues across more issue areas. These results were unexpected and sug-
gest a need for further examination. There were more judges with Liberal
ties sitting on the Ontario Court of Appeal in our time period, but the
differences are not extreme ~for example, in criminal non-charter cases,
32 per cent of the judges had some Liberal party ties, while 20 per cent
had some PC party ties!.
Although we can only speculate, if Liberal affiliates have a less struc-
tured set of ideological commitments, then perhaps they are more easily
persuaded than are Progressive Conservative affiliates. Whether seen as
a virtue or a vice, the Liberal party is known in Canadian politics for its
TABLE 2
Logit Analysis of Hypothesized Determinants of Judge Votes for
Accused in Criminal Non Charter Cases, Ont CT of Appeal,
1990–2003
Model 1 Model 2
Variable B SE Sig.* B SE Sig*
Constant 0.505 0.067 0.422 0.125
Gender 0.188 0.113 0.049 0.199 0.115 0.042
FemFem Collgue 0.188 0.157 0.232 0.222 0.157 0.156
Male1Fem Collgue 0.154 0.087 0.038 0.143 0.086 0.049
MaleMulti Fem 0.079 0.188 0.676 0.111 0.187 0.553
Party Ties 0.143 0.044 0.001 — — —
Con Ties wth Libs 0.074 0.147 0.616 — — —
Lib Ties with Cons 20.432 0.128 0.001 — — —
PtyofAppt — — — 0.003 0.140 0.490
Con Appt wth Libs — — — 0.215 0.125 0.087
Lib Appt wth Cons — — — 0.133 0.104 0.102
Crown Exper 0.075 0.207 0.359 0.075 0.210 0.361
Def Exper 0.022 0.085 0.396 0.090 0.088 0.154
GovtAsAppell 20.487 0.113 0.000 20.472 0.112 0.000
*Level of statistical significance – coefficients significant at the .05 level or better are shown
in bold. Based on one-tailed tests for variables in the expected direction.
Model 1 (N 5 3293) Model 2 (N 5 3293)
Initial log likelihood 2173.94 2205.86
Final log likelihood 2149.51 2189.43
Chi square of the model 48.86 ~10 df; sig.  0.000! 32.86 ~10 df, sig.  0.000!
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ideological pragmatism. Some social science research bears out this per-
ception. In his factor analysis of surveys completed by party delegates of
both parties, for example, Johnston found that the PCs were a more
divided party because their divisions were “more structured” and “more
relentlessly cumulative” ~1988: 65!. He also noted that “if the Liberal
left was soft, the Tory right was pretty hard” ~64!.
As illustrated in model 2 of Tables 2 to 5, our party ties measures
show significant results in the expected direction more often than mea-
sures based on party of appointment. The only exception is in family law
cases. The lack of significance of the party ties variable likely reflects
the less clear differences between the two parties in this issue area which
would lead to less predictable distinctions between appointees with strong
Liberal ties and those with strong PC ties. Since the party of appoint-
ment measure captures more than appointees who are connected to the
party and its policies, its significant performance in family cases might
be the result of some other unexplored factor.
TABLE 3
Logit Analysis of Hypothesized Determinants of Judge Votes for
Accused in Criminal Charter Cases, Ont CT Appeal, 1990–2003
Model 1 Model 2
Variable B SE Sig.* B SE Sig*
Constant 1.166 0.145 0.779 0.276
Gender 0.016 0.250 0.475 0.184 0.259 0.238
FemFem Collgue 0.265 0.388 0.494 0.147 0.391 0.708
MaleFem Collgue 0.137 0.183 0.227 0.119 0.187 0.262
MaleMulti Fem 0.380 0.474 0.423 0.331 0.480 0.490
Party Ties 0.282 0.100 0.003 — — —
Con Ties wth Libs 0.303 0.330 0.179 — — —
Lib Ties with Cons 20.438 0.286 0.063 — — —
PtyofAppt — — — 21.177 0.347 0.0011
Con Appt with Libs — — — 20.531 0.264 0.0441
Lib Appt with Cons — — — –1.071 0.287 0.0001
Crown Exper 0.422 0.456 0.355 0.185 0.476 0.697
Def Exper 0.391 0.174 0.013 0.506 0.182 0.003
GovtAsAppell 0.130 0.182 0.238 0.241 0.182 0.094
*Level of statistical significance: coefficients significant at the .05 level or better are shown in
bold. Based on one-tailed tests for variables in the expected direction.
Variable results in unexpected direction
Model 1 (N 5 860) Model 2 (N 5 865)
Initial log likelihood 498.39 500.95
Final log likelihood 488.78 485.61
Chi square of the model 19.22 ~10 df; sig.  0.038! 30.68 ~10 df, sig.  0.001!
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Outside the family law area, party of appointment does not perform
well. A vote for the accused is not more likely from a Liberal party
appointment in criminal non-charter cases and a vote for the accused is
actually less likely from a Liberal appointment in criminal charter cases.
Indeed, for criminal charter cases, all three variables based on party of
appointment are significant in the unexpected direction. Judges appointed
by the Liberal party are also less likely to support rights claimants ~in
human rights case issues!, contrary to expectations.
The number of results in the unexpected direction for party of appoint-
ment ~results that are hard to explain! is an important finding. The results
cast doubt on the accuracy of the measure and suggest the difficulties of
using the party of appointment for judges when predicting their votes.
Included in this study are judges with major political ties to the Liberal
party, who were appointed to the Ontario Court of Appeal by the Progres-
sive Conservative party, and the reverse holds true as well. We believe these
judges are more likely to be influenced by the party with which they had
significant political ties, than the party that appointed them to the Court
of Appeal.8
TABLE 4
Logit Analysis of Hypothesized Determinants of Judge Votes for
Wife0Mother in Family Law Cases, Ont CT Appeal, 1990–2003
Model 1 Model 2
Variable B SE Sig.* B SE Sig*
Constant 0.662 0.161 0.876 0.336
Gender 0.584 0.303 0.027 0.646 0.311 0.019
FemFem Collgue 0.326 0.401 0.417 0.119 0.408 0.771
MaleFem Collgue 0.208 0.219 0.171 0.211 0.222 0.171
MaleMulti Fem 0.360 0.435 0.204 0.533 0.456 0.122
Party Ties 0.084 0.120 0.243 — — —
Con Ties wth Libs 0.202 0.389 0.604 — — —
Lib Ties with Cons –0.782 0.303 0.005 — — —
PtyofAppt — — — 1.752 0.360 0.000
Con Appt with Libs — — — 1.594 0.350 0.000
Lib Appt wth Cons — — — 0.197 0.253 0.218
Govt Exper –0.995 0.491 0.043 21.256 0.440 0.004
FemAsAppell –0.553 0.185 0.002 –0.629 0.189 0.001
*Level of statistical significance: coefficients significant at the .05 level or better are shown in
bold. Based on one-tailed tests for variables in the expected direction.
Model 1 (N 5 545) Model 2 (N 5 548)
Initial log likelihood 362.83 364.76
Final log likelihood 349.50 340.30
Chi square of the model 26.66 ~9 df; sig.  0.002! 48.92 ~9 df, sig.  0.000!
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b! Gender
The gender of the judge also appears to have influenced a judge’s vote in
various issue areas. A vote for the accused was more likely from a female
judge in criminal non-charter case issues ~p,.05!. In addition, consis-
tent with our hypotheses, a vote for the woman litigant was more likely
from a female judge in family law case issues, and a vote for the rights
claimant was more likely from a female judge in human rights case issues
~p,.05 for both!. Indeed, female justices were 18 per cent more likely
to support the rights claimant than their male colleagues.
The influence of colleagues is less clear with regard to gender.9 Add-
ing a second female to the bench does not appear to affect a female judge’s
vote in any of our case issues. However, a vote for the accused was more
likely from male judges when they were on a panel with a female judge
~p,.05! in criminal non-charter cases, although the 4 per cent difference
is small. Male judges also appear to be influenced by the presence of a
female judge in human rights case issues ~but only at the .06 level!. A
TABLE 5
Logit Analysis of Hypothesized Determinants of Judge Votes for Rights
Claimant in Human Rights Cases, Ont CT Appeals, 1990–2003
Model 1 Model 2
Variable B SE Sig.* B SE Sig*
Constant 0.374 0.315 0.937 0.524
Gender 0.798 0.414 0.027 0.661 0.414 0.055
FemFem Collgue 0.125 0.644 0.423 0.288 0.667 0.333
Male1Fem Collgue 0.522 0.344 0.065 0.427 0.348 0.110
MaleMulti Fem 0.552 0.936 0.278 0.766 0.922 0.203
Party Ties 0.189 0.167 0.129 — — —
Con Ties with Libs 0.981 0.548 0.037 — — —
Lib Ties with Cons 0.247 0.415 0.551 — — —
PtyofAppt — — — 21.248 0.539 0.0211
Con Appt with Libs — — — 21.025 0.502 0.0411
Lib Appt with Cons — — — 0.030 0.387 0.939
Govt Exper 22.097 1.106 0.029 22.132 1.073 0.024
RtsClaimAppell 21.218 0.305 0.000 21.238 0.308 0.000
*Level of statistical significance – coefficients significant at the .05 level or better are shown
in bold. Based on one-tailed tests for variables in the expected direction.
Variable results in unexpected direction
Model 1 (N 5 271) Model 2 (N 5 272)
Initial Log Likelihood 174.93 175.35
Final Log Likelihood 158.11 156.86
Chi Square of the Model 33.64 ~9 df; sig.  0.000! 36.99 ~9 df, sig.  0.000!
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vote for the accused in the criminal case category is not more likely from
a male judge if there is more than one female on the panel and this result
is consistent across all the other issue areas as well. Farhang and Wawro
~2004! had a similar finding in their study of the US Courts of Appeal.
The addition of more than one female does not increase the probability
of a male judge voting in a particular direction; the effect appears to be
created by the addition of the first female. Overall, the influence of col-
leagues appears more consistent when examining partisan ties, than when
examining gender.
c! Professional background
Tables 2 to 5 indicate that the professional background of a judge has
influence in a few of the issue areas. In criminal charter cases, a vote for
the accused was more likely by judges who had defence work in their
background ~p,.05!. However, this result did not hold in criminal non-
charter cases. Perhaps the same influences are not working in these cases
that lack civil liberties claims, and even former defence attorneys view
these accused less favourably.
While we expected former Crown attorneys to be less likely to sup-
port the accused in criminal cases, this variable did not reach statistical
significance in any of the models. This result is perhaps not surprising
given the low number of Crown attorneys on the Ontario Court of Appeal
TABLE 6
Probability Change of Voting for Accused0Woman0Rights Claimant,





Gender ~0 male, 1 female! 5% — 13% 18%
Male judge with 1 female judge ~0,1! 4% — — 11%
Party ties ~2 Strong Conservative
2 Strong Liberal!
13% 21% — —
Judge with Conservative ties on
panel with at least one judge
with Liberal ties ~0, 1!
— — — 23%
Judge with Liberal ties on panel
with at least one judge with
Conservative ties ~0,1!
10% 7% 19% —
Past Crown or government
attorney ~0,1!
— — 24% 25%
Past defense ~0.1! — 8% N0A N0A
**The probability change was constructed by placing all variables at their mean value and mov-
ing the variable of interest from its minimum to its maximum value.
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during our time frame. It may be that the influence would be more visi-
ble with more Crowns on the bench. Alternatively, it may mean that those
who argue Prime Minister Harper is putting more former Crowns on the
bench in an effort to appoint more law-and-order judges, have little to
fear. Those already on the Ontario Court of Appeal are not voting for the
accused in a significantly different way than judges from other profes-
sions. We will need to include more years and courts in the model—and
thus more judges and more Crown attorneys—to determine which of these
alternatives is correct.
As discussed above, the possible deliberate appointment of former
Crowns to the bench increased our interest in the professional back-
ground of judges. We decided to explore this factor beyond the criminal
area. Thus, in other case categories we include a variable measuring
another frequent former profession of judges: government attorney ~work-
ing outside the criminal area!. This variable performs as we expected in
the human rights area: former government attorneys are 25 per cent less
likely to vote in favour of the rights claimant ~p,.05!. Since their for-
mer career may have involved defending the government in court, these
judges may be more sympathetic to the government’s position and less
inclined to support a rights claimant challenging a government entity.
As we stated, we did not have expectations for how former govern-
ment attorneys would vote differently in family case issues.10 The results
of the model suggest that a former government attorney is less likely to
support the female litigant in family law cases ~p,.05!. We do not have
a ready explanation for this result. However, in future work we intend to
explore both it and the influence of other professional backgrounds on
the votes of judges.
d! Appellant
The scholarly literature in both the United States and Canada suggested
a control for another potential influence on judges’ votes: the Crown
as appellant in criminal cases. For other types of case categories we
also included a control variable measuring the identity of the appellant.
These variables performed as expected in all the case categories we tested
them in.
5. Discussion
Our results have shown that party affiliation and gender matter to indi-
vidual judicial voting behaviour in various types of cases. For example,
judges with Liberal ties are more likely to vote for the accused in crim-
inal cases, and women are more likely to vote for the rights claimant in
human rights cases. However, we found that judges’ voting behaviour
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may vary when an individual with different party ties or gender charac-
teristics joins them on a panel. What do these findings for the Ontario
Court of Appeal mean for key areas of judicial process, particularly selec-
tion and decision making processes? Answering this question implicates
various normative and empirical issues about the role of law and courts
in the larger system of governance.
In the US, some commentators have used such results to argue that
decision-making panels in the federal courts of appeal should be mixed
in terms of their political and gender make-up. Stribopoulos and Yahya
make a similar claim in Canada, arguing that “diversity in the political
and gender mix of appellate court panels is essential.” They suggest that
the registrar of the court who assigns judges to hear cases could develop
a process to ensure such diversity on panels. This seems like a straight-
forward proposal, but many complications arise on closer inspection. Since
we argue that political affiliation is a more accurate predictor than party
of appointment, determining the political mix on a panel would require
knowledge of a judge’s connections to a party and party officials. In terms
of gender, how would the registrar know which particular women on the
court reflected the “ethic of care” in their decisions and which ones did
not? ~And what about males who might hold stereotypes about women
that led them to be subconsciously biased in favour of the woman in fam-
ily law cases?! Would the judicial selection system have to be changed
such that enough female appointees who did exhibit the ethic of care and
enough partisans of various stripes were selected to each appellate court
to allow for balanced panels to be created?
Those who view the law as reasonably determinate and who desire
the courts to primarily be “adjudicators of legal disputes” within the polit-
ical system would argue that there should be no consideration of party
ties or gender in the judicial selection process. The process should empha-
size legal professionalism ~knowledge of case law and so on! above all
else. At the federal level, this might necessitate the creation of a nomi-
nation committee system where legal members and lay people recom-
mend the three most qualified applicants for a judicial opening and the
Minister of Justice must choose one of those individuals for the appoint-
ment. Individuals wanting appointments to the appellate court from the
trial court would also need to go through this process. According to this
view, courts will make policy interstitially when deciding some cases and
some minor variations in decision making will result from personalities,
but the emphasis on “the law” would mitigate political considerations
~partisan, gender, ethnicity and so on! in both appointments and deci-
sion making.
Alternatively, those who value the courts as “policy makers” ~whether
because the courts are perceived to be more accessible to minority groups
or able to push politicians on sensitive issues!, or simply believe that the
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law is relatively more indeterminate and socially constructed, would wel-
come certain political considerations in the judicial appointment pro-
cess, such as gender and ethnicity. What a supporter of the “adjudicative
model” might see as “bias” in decision making, is seen by this view as
bringing a valuable perspective to the development of the law ~Malleson,
2003!.11
Although these two “ideal types” of law and courts—the adjudica-
tive model and the policy making model—help us to structure our think-
ing about the relationship between judicial selection, decision making and
the role of courts in the governing process, there are complexities to those
relationships not adequately captured above. First, it is likely that whether
someone supports the inclusion of political considerations in the judicial
selection process depends on what those political considerations are ~for
example, the appointment of law-and-order judges versus the appoint-
ment of “progressive” judges!. Second, some people argue for an altered
judicial appointment system, such as reducing the importance of politi-
cal patronage and appointing more minorities, for reasons of fairness and
legitimacy not connected to decision-making outcomes. Third, the insti-
tutional context of intermediate courts of appeal lends itself to both the
“adjudicative” and “policy-making” styles of decision making. Some insti-
tutional factors associated with the policy-making model include the lead-
ership role that such courts provide in contested areas of the law and the
rare chance that their decisions will be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, some case types decided by the appellate courts allow for
the influence of non-legal factors and have considerable policy ramifica-
tions. This is particularly true in rights cases. Perhaps it is not surprising,
therefore, that we find considerable support for our hypotheses in these
areas of the law. For example, a female judge is 18 per cent more likely
to favour the rights claimant in human rights cases.
These results may prompt some to consider changes in the judicial
appointment system and how judges are placed on panels. However, there
is also the reality that intermediate appellate courts are forced to hear a
number of routine cases that are easily disposed of by the law, that there
is a high rate of unanimity on such courts and that courts like the Ontario
Court of Appeal are not the final court of appeal. Just as it might not be
surprising that we had significant results in rights cases, it may not be sur-
prising that in other case areas our statistical measures prove to be weak
or not significant.
6. Conclusion
Different influences on the appointment process may in fact result in dif-
ferent decisions by the chosen judges. Our findings suggest that judges
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appointed as a result of their political ties or their gender may vote dif-
ferently on some case issues. A judge’s past profession may also have an
influence on their decision making once on the bench. Thus, it might make
a difference if Prime Minister Harper concentrates on appointing former
Crowns to the bench. And it should definitely make a difference if he
focuses on the political affiliation of appointees. Initial research into the
Harper appointments suggests that the Harper government is appointing
party affiliates at roughly the same rate as previous governments. How-
ever, as his Conservative government is an amalgam of the former PC
party and the more right-wing Canadian Alliance party the political affil-
iates chosen by Harper may be more conservative than previous appoint-
ments. This may in turn make a difference to the outcome of cases in some
areas of law. This will be particularly true if Harper is deliberately appoint-
ing judges on the basis of policy preferences, as he appears to be doing
with his promise to appoint more law-and-order judges.
Regardless of whether one sees the influence of judicial character-
istics as beneficial or harmful to judicial decision making, there is much
left to be done before one argues for or against changes in the judicial
selection process. First, while we believe our measure of party affilia-
tion captures influence more accurately than party of appointing prime
minister, a more sophisticated measure of ideology for judges on courts
below the Supreme Court still needs to be developed. Such a measure
will need to be cognizant that historically, appointment of party affili-
ates has tended to be based more on patronage than policy preferences.
Thus ideological differences appear more as a by-product of party affil-
iation rather than by deliberate design. For the time being, at least, Harper
is the only prime minister who has seemingly paid much attention to
the ideological make-up of the judiciary.
Not only do we need to think more carefully about ideology and its
relationship to party, we also need to better theorize and test gender influ-
ences. For example, to better test whether women judges are more sym-
pathetic to victims and underdogs, it might be useful to compare the
gender results in criminal cases involving offences against the person
and criminal cases involving offences against property.
Finally, we need to test our theories and measures, across time, and
across appellate courts. The Ontario Court of Appeal is the preeminent
court of appeal in Canada. It will be useful to discuss whether the same
influences are at work elsewhere on courts that receive less attention.
Previous work has also found that our measure of partisan ties might
differ across the country. Judges sitting on courts in the Atlantic prov-
inces are much more likely to have major political ties than judges sit-
ting on courts in British Columbia. Thus the next step of researchers in
this area should be to test these measures, and other improved ones, on
provincial courts of appeal across Canada.
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Notes
1 Peter McCormick has presented extensive research on decisions in the Alberta and
Manitoba courts of appeal in particular, but he does not use quantitative modeling to
test for effects.
2 Legal elites included law professors with more than ten years experience and prom-
inent senior lawyers. The latter category included lawyers who had held positions in
provincial law societies and the Canadian Bar Association as well as lawyers desig-
nated as Queen’s Counsel. We supplemented the legal elite information through inter-
views with senior party officials and senior government officials involved in judicial
selection.
3 This study does not include criminal cases with a gender component, such as sexual
assault, as such cases may cloud the analysis. Female judges might be expected to
view such gender specific cases differently from other criminal cases.
4 The Stribopoulos andYahya data had a distinct case issue for each row entry and five
columns of judge vote for the five possible positions on a panel. After creating all
the case-specific variables we flipped the data so that judge vote became the depen-
dent variable with each row representing a different judge’s vote on an issue. The
data included cases decided by both three- and five-judge panels and we include both
in our models. Following the practice of some of the court of appeal literature in the
United States, we also ran the models excluding panels of five. This did not have a
significant effect on our results ~the performance of our variables of interest remained
consistent!, and without a strong reason to exclude these en banc panels, we pre-
ferred to use all the data.
5 This variable differs by case category. For criminal cases one variable measures whether
the judge was a past Crown while another measures if he or she was a past defence
attorney. For all other cases, one variable measures whether a judge was a past gov-
ernment attorney.
6 This variable also differs by case category. For criminal cases it measures the pres-
ence of the Crown as the appellant in the case. For family law it measures if the
woman was the appellant. For human rights cases it determines if the rights claimant
was the appellant.
7 For our time period, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed 59 per cent of all family
law cases and 69 per cent of human rights cases.
8 This should be particularly true for the judges who have been appointed to the Trial
Court by one party and appointed to the Court of Appeal by a different party, a not
infrequent event.
9 We ran the models again without the measures of colleagues’ gender in order to test
the influence of gender alone. We also ran this model ~and the others! with just one
of the colleagues’ gender measures. The results were consistent across all the mod-
els, with the same variables of interest remaining significant.
10 With no expectation for this variable in this case category, we also ran the model exclud-
ing it from the analysis. This did not affect the results of the model; the same variables
were significant in the same direction. As we are interested in exploring the possible
influence of professional background we report the model with this variable included.
11 In a case revolving around whether a black, woman trial judge showed “apprehen-
sion of bias” when she accepted the testimony of an accused ~black! youth over a
police officer, two Canadian Supreme Court judges in a concurring opinion seem-
ingly endorsed the latter perspective. “The sound belief behind the encouragement of
greater diversity in judicial appointments was that women and visible minorities would
bring an important perspective to the difficult task of judging” ~R. v. S. (R.D.!, 1997
at para 119!. Also see the debate over the nomination of US Supreme Court Justice
Sonia Sotomayor.
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